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Abstract
Over the last few decades, electricity markets around the world have adopted multi-settlement structures, allowing for balancing
of supply and demand as more accurate forecast information becomes available. Given increasing uncertainty due to adoption of
renewables, more recent market design work has focused on optimization of expectation of some quantity, e.g. social welfare.
However, social planners and policy makers are often risk averse, so that such risk neutral formulations do not adequately
reflect prevailing attitudes towards risk, nor explain the decisions that follow. Hence we incorporate the commonly used risk
measure conditional value at risk (CVaR) into the central planning objective, and study how a two-stage market operates when
the individual generators are risk neutral. Our primary result is to show existence (by construction) of a sequential competitive
equilibrium (SCEq) in this risk-aware two-stage market. Given equilibrium prices, we design a market mechanism which achieves
social cost minimization assuming that agents are non strategic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity markets covering the majority of the US, and most of the industrialized world are operated as multi-settlement
markets. These markets are organized in the sense that demand for and supply of energy and ancillary services are matched
via a centralized auction mechanism, as opposed to bilateral negotiations over individual transactions [6], [9]. An independent
system operator (ISO) runs a given market as a series of multi stage forward markets, and a real time or spot market. Depending
upon the region, forward markets are settled days or hours ahead of the intended time of delivery, allowing for provision of
cheaper, but relatively inflexible generation. Spot markets open and are settled minutes before delivery in order to balance
supply and demand in real time.
While the clearing mechanisms in electricity markets are designed with the objective of maximizing welfare of both producers
and consumers, the imperative to increase penetration of renewables and reduce reliance on fossil fuels now strains the existing
multi-settlement paradigm. In the past, the primary source of uncertainty in market clearing came from demand side deviations,
and such errors reduced to under 5% by the opening of spot markets [7]. Current levels of renewable adoption have already
exacerbated typical levels of uncertainty for net demand (demand minus renewable generation), and under official mandates to
increase the proportion of energy sourced from renewables this trend will only continue. For example, in California renewables
constitute nearly 34% of total retail sales, while a recently passed state bill legislates that 100% of power come from renewables
by 2045 [2], [5]. Reliance on renewables to this degree introduces an order of magnitude greater uncertainty in net demand,
and necessitates novel market designs to address this challenge.
As a starting point, given that economic dispatch is a multi-settlement process, it makes sense to couple markets across
forward and real time stages, and then allow for recourse decisions, rather than settle each stage independently. If a probability
distribution for the stochastic generation is known, then maximization of expected welfare is a reasonable objective. This type
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2of problem can be formulated as a two-stage stochastic program, and in fact it is possible to show that stochastic clearing is
more efficient than two-settlement systems [6], [8].
There are a couple of issues with the use of expected social welfare as an objective function. In purely mathematical terms,
a given realization of a random variable can be quite different from its expectation. Thus optimization of an expectation
guarantees little in terms of variation over possible outcomes. Further, real-world observations indicate that economic decision
makers are risk averse, or at least act so [1]. Therefore, given increasing levels of generation variability, it is of both theoretical
and practical interest to incorporate some notion of risk into market objective functions.
In this paper we study how the introduction of risk preferences into the central objective function affects market operation.
We consider a setting with an ISO and multiple generators. The ISO owns a nondispatchable, renewable resource, and the
market clears in two stages: a forward stage in which only a forecast for renewable generation is available, and a real time
stage, wherein the exact realized renewable generation is known. The generators each own primary and ancillary plants, which
may be dispatched in the forward and real time stages, respectively. In the forward market, the ISO schedules primary energy
procurements from the generators, and in the real time market purchases ancillary service where necessary. All participants
are assumed to be non-strategic price takers. However, while we assume that the generators seek to maximize their expected
profit, the ISO is risk averse and minimizes a weighted sum of the expectation and conditional value at risk (CVaR) of its
costs. CVaR has over the past two decades become the most widely used risk measure, due to the fact that it is a coherent
risk measure, and can be calculated via a convex program [4].
Our main result is the proof of existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) in this risk aware, two-stage market
with recourse. In particular, we demonstrate the existence of first and second stage prices such that, given these prices, the
generation decisions of the generators in both decisions achieve market clearance in stage two, thus balancing supply and
demand. We then specify a two-stage market mechanism which implements the SCEq.
Related work. Numerous past works have studied market and mechanism design and equilibrium outcomes in the two-stage
expected welfare maximization, or risk neutral setting, e.g., [3], [15] and [16].
Turning to literature which incorporates risk preferences, several works consider settings in which agents may enter into
contracts in order to hedge against risky outcomes. In [11] it is shown that a complete market, wherein all uncertainties can
be addressed via a balanced set of contracts, involving agents equipped with coherent risk measures, is equivalent to one in
which said agents are risk neutral, and take actions based on a probability density function determined by a system risk agent.
The work then investigates necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium consisting of allocations, prices
and contracts. Assuming a similar setting in the context of hydro thermal markets, [10] shows that given a sufficiently rich set
of securities are available to risk averse agents, that a multi-stage competitive equilibrium may be derived from the solution
to a risk-averse social planning solution. [6] investigates difficulties that may arise when risk averse agents maximize their
welfare in a market are not complete, including existence of multiple, potentially stable equilibria. Our setting differs from
these works in that we have one risk aware customer for multiple risk neutral producers, and we do not allow for transactions
between agents outside of the quantities of energy purchased and consumed.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Risk Measures
In stochastic optimization we are concerned with losses Z(ω) = L(x, ω) that are both a function of a decision x, as well
as some random outcome ω, unknown when the decision is made. Generally speaking, a risk measure is a functional which
3accepts as input the entire collection of realizations Z(ω), w ∈ Ω.
More specifically, consider a sample space (Ω,F) equipped with sigma algebra F , on which random functions Z = Z(ω)
are defined. A risk measure ρ(Z) maps such random functions into the extended real line [13]. Often times the domain of ρ,
denoted Z is taken as Lp(Ω,F , P ) for some p ∈ [1,+∞) and reference probability measure P . The following characteristics
of risk measures will become useful in later sections.
Definition 1: A proper risk measure satisfies ρ(Z) > −∞ for all Z ∈ Z and
dom(ρ) := {Z ∈ Z : ρ(Z) <∞}.
We denote by Z  Z ′ the pointwise partial order, meaning Z(ω) ≥ Z ′(ω) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Definition 2: A risk measure is monotonic if Z,Z ′ ∈ Z and Z  Z ′ implies ρ(Z) ≥ ρ(Z ′).
Definition 3: A risk measure is coherent if it is monotonic, convex and satisfies translation equivariance and positive
homogeneity (see [13] for details on these properties).
B. Conditional value at risk
In the following sections, we will focus in particular on conditional value at risk, or CVaR. CVaR is an example of a coherent
risk measure [13]. Before defining CVaR, we introduce the related quantity, value at risk.
Suppose that random variable Z is distributed according to Borel probability measure P , with associated sample space
(Ω,F), and cdf F . When Z represents losses, the α-Value-at-Risk is defined as follows.
Definition 4: For a given confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), the α-Value-at-Risk or VaRα of random loss Z = Z(ω) is
VaRα(Z) = min{z : F (z) ≥ α}. (1)
Thus, VaRα(Z) is the lowest amount z such that, with probability α, Z will not exceed z. In the case where F is continuous,
VaRα(Z) is the unique z satisfying F (z) = α. Otherwise, it is possible that the equation F (z) = α has no solution, or an
interval of solutions, depending upon the choice of α. This, among other difficulties, motivates the use of alternative risk
measures such as CVaR [12].
Informally CVaRα of Z gives the expected value of Z , given that Z ≥ VaRα(Z). The precise definition is as follows. Let
[x]+ = max{0, x}.
Definition 5: [12] Let
φα(Z, ζ) = ζ +
1
1− α
E[Z − ζ]+. (2)
Then CVaRα(Z) = minζ φα(Z, ζ), and
VaRα(Z) = lower endpoint of argmin
ζ
φα(Z, ζ). (3)
It follows from the joint convexity of φα in Z and ζ that CVaRα is convex over Z . Restricting attention to random losses
Z(ω) = L(x, ω) which depend upon a decision x, we have the following result.
Theorem 1: Let Z(ω) = L(x, ω). If the mapping x 7→ Z is convex in x then CVaRα(Z) is convex in x [12].
Theorem 1 will later ensure that optimization problems with objectives including a CVaRα term are convex.
4III. RISK AWARE STOCHASTIC ECONOMIC DISPATCH FORMULATION
We consider a setting with N conventional generators, and a single renewable generator. An additional entity, the independent
system operator (ISO) operates the power grid and plays the role of the social planner (from this point we use the terms
interchangeably). For simplicity we consider a single bus network.
We consider a two-stage setting, where generation is dispatched in the first stage (also referred to as day-ahead or DA) and
then adjusted in the second stage (real time or RT) to match demand.
Let D ≥ 0 denote the aggregate demand. This demand is assumed inelastic, i.e., it is not affected by changes in first or
second stage prices.
The renewable generator’s output is modeled as a nonnegative random variable W , upper bounded by W > 0. We make
the following additional assumption on the distribution of W .
Assumption 1: Random variable W is distributed according to pdf fW (and cdf FW ), which is continuous and positive on
[0,W ].
The probability distribution of W is assumed to be known to all market participants. The marginal cost of renewable
generation is zero. The quantity of renewable generation scheduled is denoted y.
Conventional generator i has access to a primary plant and an ancillary plant. Generator i schedules its primary plant to
produce quantity xGi ∈ R+ prior to realization of W at cost ai(x
G
i )
2 where ai > 0. We assume the primary plant is inflexible,
so that its generation level must remained fixed once it is scheduled. After realization ofW , generator i can activate its ancillary
plant to produce level zGi ∈ R+ at cost a˜i(z
G
i )
2 where a˜i > 0. Any ancillary generation produced in excess of aggregate
demand D can be disposed of or sold in a separate spot market, which we do not consider. We assume that ai < a˜i for all i,
ai 6= aj for i 6= j, and that maxi ai < mini a˜i and a˜i 6= a˜j for i 6= j.
The generator is compensated for its first stage production xGi at price P1. In the second stage, given W = w, the generator
is compensated for second stage generation zGi (w) at price P2(w).
A. Generator’s Problem
We assume that each generator i is price taking, i.e., its decisions xGi and z
G
i (w) do not affect prices in either stage.
Therefore, generator i’s profit is given by
πGi (x
G
i , z
G
i (w)) := P1x
G
i − ai(x
G
i )
2
+ P2(w)z
G
i (w)− a˜i(z
G
i (w))
2.
(4)
Each generator is risk neutral, and so makes first and second stages to maximize the expectation of (4). In stage 2, given
production level w and price P2(w), generator i solves the following problem
(GEN2i) max
zG
i
(w)≥0
P2(w)z
G
i (w)− a˜i(z
G
i (w))
2. (5)
Let π2i (w,P2) be the maximum objective value obtained in solving (5), given w and P2. Then in the first stage, given price
P1, generator i solves the following problem
(GEN1i) max
xG
i
≥0
P1x
G
i − ci(x
G
i ) + E[π
2
i (W,P2)]. (6)
5The term E[π2i (W,P2)] is a constant when optimizing over x
G
i , as generator i’s DA and RT decisions can be made independently.
In order to emphasize the fact that generator i observes W = w prior to selecting zGi (w), we separate generator i’s two
optimization problems.
B. ISO’s Problem
In Section III, our definition of a sequential competitive equilibrium includes a tuple of allocations, i.e., generation levels.
For the purposes of examining the welfare properties of these allocations, we now introduce a two stage social planner’s
problem (SPP), corresponding to our two settlement market. As is seen in the static case, the SPP involves maximizing the
social welfare of all market participants. We take the welfare of generator i to be the negation of generation costs from stages
1 and 2. Given W = w, the aggregate welfare is the negation of the summation of these costs over all generators:
cSPP(w) :=
∑
i
(
aixˆ
2
i + a˜izˆ
2
i (w)
)
, (7)
where (xˆi, zˆi(w)) for all i and w are the social planner’s decisions in stages 1 and 2. Define xˆ := (xˆ1, . . . , xˆN ), and similarly
zˆ(w) := (zˆ1(w), . . . , zˆN (w)).
We assume that the social planner is risk averse. That is, instead of seeking to minimize the expectation of (7), they seek to
minimize a weighted combination of E[cSPP(W )] and CVaRα(c
SPP(W )). α ∈ [0, 1) signifies that the ISO considers worst case
or tail events with cumulative probability 1−α to be “risky”, and therefore weights them more heavily. We now introduce the
additional parameter ǫ ∈ [0, 1], which gives the social planner’s relative weighting of overall expectation and CVaRα of the
first and second stage generation costs, and define the social planner’s risk measure as
ρSPP(·) = (1− ǫ)E[·] + ǫCVaRα(·). (8)
It can be shown that ρSPP(·) is a coherent risk measure [13].
Given that yˆ is the amount of renewable generation scheduled by the social planner in stage 1, and W = w, the social
planner’s second stage problem is
(SPP2) min
zˆ(w)≥0
∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (w) (9)
s.t.
∑
i
zˆi(w) ≥ yˆ − w. (10)
Note that constraint (10) is an inequality in order to accommodate scenarios in which renewable generation exceeds residual
demand D −
∑
i xˆi = yˆ.
Define cSPP2 (xˆ, w) as the minimum aggregate social cost achieved in the second stage, given xˆ and W = w. Then the social
planner’s first stage problem is
(SPP1) min
xˆ,yˆ≥0
∑
i
aixˆ
2
i + ρSPP
(
cSPP2 (xˆ,W )
)
(11)
s.t.
∑
i
xˆi + yˆ = D, (12)
where we have used translation equivariance of CVaRα to move the summed first-stage costs outside of ρSPP. We now argue
that problems (SPP1) and (SPP2) can be combined into the following single stage optimization problem.
6Lemma 2: The two-stage problem (SPP1)-(SPP2) is equivalent to the following single stage problem:
(SPP) min
xˆ,yˆ,zˆ(·)≥0
∑
i
ci(xˆi) + ρSPP
(∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (W )
)
(13)
s.t.
∑
i
xˆi + yˆ = D (14)
∑
i
zˆi(w) ≥ yˆ − w ∀w, (15)
where zˆ(·) : R+ → R+.
Proof 1: See Appendix.
Here we use the term “equivalent” in the sense that (SPP) and (SPP1) have the same optimal objective value. Additionally, if
(xˆ∗, zˆ∗(·)) is optimal for (SPP), then xˆ∗ is optimal for (SPP1), and zˆ∗(w) is optimal for (SPP2) for all w, given xˆ∗. Conversely,
if xˆ∗ is optimal for (SPP1) and zˆ∗(·) collects the optimal solutions to (SPP2) for all w, given xˆ∗, then (xˆ∗, zˆ∗(·)) is optimal
for (SPP).
Similar to the equivalency demonstrated for the ISO’s problem in Lemma 2, it can be shown that the following single stage
problem is equivalent to (GEN1i) and (GEN2i)
(GENi) max
xG
i
≥0,zG
i
(·)≥0
P1x
G
i − ai(x
G
i )
2
+ E[P2(w)z
G
i (w) − a˜i(z
G
i (w))
2].
(16)
where zGi (·) : R+ → R+.
IV. SEQUENTIAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In a single stage market for a single good, a competitive equilibrium is specified by a price P and quantity x such that,
given P , producers find it optimal to produce, and consumers find it optimal to purchase, quantity x of the good. Thus, the
market clears, i.e., demand equals supply.
To understand the outcome of the two-stage market, we consider a sequential version of competitive equilibrium.
Definition 6: A sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) is a tuple (x∗, z∗(·), P ∗1 , P
∗
2 (·)) such that, for all i, given P
∗
1 and
P ∗2 (·), x
∗
i is optimal for (GEN1i), z
∗
i is optimal for (GEN2i), and there exists a y
∗, such that
∑
i
x∗i + y
∗ = D,
∑
i
z∗i (w) ≥ y
∗ − w ∀w. (17)
Note that in the SCEq definition, z∗i (·) and P
∗
2 (·) are functions. We now investigate the existence of an SCEq in our two
stage, risk aware setting.
Let µˆ(w) be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint (10). The Lagrangian for (SPP2) is
L =
∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (w) + µˆ(w)
(
yˆ − w −
∑
i
zˆi(w)
)
, (18)
7giving, in addition to feasibility, the following optimality conditions for problem (SPP2):
2a˜izˆ
∗
i (w) − µˆ
∗(w) ≥ 0 ∀i (19)
zˆ∗i (2a˜izˆ
∗
i (w) − µˆ
∗(w)) = 0 ∀i (20)
µˆ∗(w)
(
yˆ∗ − w −
∑
i
zˆ∗i (w)
)
= 0 ∀w, (21)
µˆ∗(w) ≥ 0 ∀w. (22)
Assuming yˆ > w, zˆ∗i (w) > 0 for all i, and in particular
zˆ∗i (w) =
µˆ∗(w)
2a˜i
. (23)
If yˆ ≤ w then zˆ∗i (w) = 0 for all i. Summing (23) over i, applying constraint (15), and rearranging gives
µˆ∗(w) = 2a˜ · [yˆ − w]+ , (24)
where the constant a˜ is defined as a˜ :=
(∑
i
1
a˜i
)−1
. Therefore
zˆ∗i (w) = a˜ ·
[yˆ − w]+
a˜i
.
Summing over i gives the optimal second stage objective value (i.e., the minimum recourse cost given xˆ)
cSPP2 (xˆ, w) =
∑
i∈I
a˜i
(
a˜ ·
[yˆ − w]+
a˜i
)2
= a˜ · [yˆ − w]2+ . (25)
Therefore, VaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) may be expressed as
VaRα
(
a˜ · [yˆ −W ]2+
)
= inf
{
t : P
(
a˜ · [yˆ −W ]
2
+ ≤ t
)
≥ α
}
(26)
= inf
{
t ≥ 0 : P
(
W < yˆ −
√
t
a˜
)
≤ 1− α
}
=


0 if yˆ < F−1W (1− α)
a˜ · (yˆ − F−1W (1− α))
2 if yˆ ≥ F−1W (1− α).
(27)
Given this expression for VaRα, the following lemma gives an explicit expression of CVaRα for our quadratic cost function
setting.
Lemma 3: Assuming first and second stage generation cost functions of the form ax2 and a˜z(w)2, a, a˜ > 0, CVaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W ))
can be expressed as
CVaRα
(
cSPP2 (xˆ,W )
)
= CVaRα
(
a˜ · [yˆ −W ]2+
)
=
1
1− α
∫ min{F−1
W
(1−α),yˆ}
0
a˜ · (yˆ − w)2 fW (w) dw.
(28)
Proof 2: Given Assumption 1, the cdf FcSPP
2
of losses cSPP2 (yˆ,W ) will be continuous everywhere except possibly at zero,
8since P (cSPP2 (xˆ,W ) = 0) = P (W ≥ yˆ). By Theorem 6.2 of [13], when VaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) > 0, we may write
CVaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) =
1
1− α
∫ a˜yˆ2
a˜·(yˆ−F−1
W
(1−α))2
qfcSPP
2
(q) dq
=
1
1− α
∫ F−1
W
(1−α)
0
(yˆ − w)2fW (w) dw, (29)
where fcSPP
2
gives the pdf corresponding to FcSPP
2
. If VaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) = 0, then using Definition 5, we have that
CVaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) = ζ
∗ +
1
1− α
E[cSPP2 (xˆ,W )− ζ
∗]+
= 0 +
1
1− α
E[cSPP2 (xˆ,W )− 0]+
=
1
1− α
∫ yˆ
0
cSPP2 (xˆ, w)fW (w) dw. (30)
Substituting for cSPP2 (xˆ, w) and then combining (29) and (30) completes the proof.
While CVaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) is convex in the first stage decision xˆ due to (25) and Theorem 1, the upper limit θˆ of the integral
in (28) is not a differentiable function of yˆ, so that the Leibniz integral rule does not directly apply. The next lemma addresses
this issue.
Lemma 4: Given Assumption 1, expression (28) is continuously differentiable with respect to yˆ, with derivative
CVaR′α(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) = 2a˜
∫ θˆ
0
(yˆ − w)fW (w) dw. (31)
Proof 3: We consider two cases, depending on the two possible values of θˆ(yˆ). When θˆ(yˆ) = F−1W (1 − α), applying the
Leibniz integral rule gives
CVaR′α(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) = 2a˜
∫ F−1
W
(1−α)
0
(yˆ − w)fW (w) dw.
When θˆ(yˆ) = yˆ, application of the Leibniz integral rule gives
CVaR′α(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) = 2a˜
∫ yˆ
0
(yˆ − w)fW (w) dw.
Combining the last two equations gives the expression in the lemma statement. When yˆ ≤ F−1W (1− α), CVaR
′
α(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W ))
is an affine function of yˆ, and when yˆ > F−1W (1 − α), CVaR
′
α(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) is continuous by the continuity of fW (w). The
two expressions agree at yˆ = F−1W (1− α), so that CVaR
′
α(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) is continuous.
Let θˆ = θˆ(yˆ) = min{F−1W (1− α), yˆ}. Then, problem (SPP) may be written as
min
xˆ,yˆ,zˆ(·)≥0
∑
i
aixˆ
2
i + (1− ǫ)
∫ yˆ
0
∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (w) fW (w) dw (32)
+
ǫ
1− α
∫ θˆ
0
∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (w) fW (w) dw
s.t.
∑
i
xˆi + yˆ = D (33)
∑
i
zˆi(w) ≥ yˆ − w ∀w. (34)
Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a commonly used settlement scheme for economic dispatch problems, and previous
work has examined extensions of LMPs to problems including two stage markets with recourse. In such models, the LMPs
9arise as the dual variables to power balance constraints for each stage (in our setting (33) and (34) in (SPP)). Previous work
([3],[15]) has demonstrated that such LMPs support a competitive equilibrium when the ISO or social planner is risk neutral,
i.e. when ǫ = 0. We state this formally in terms of our setting in the following theorem.
Let λˆ∗ and µˆ∗(w) denote the optimal Lagrange multipliers for constraints (33) and (34), given W = w, respectively.
Theorem 5: When ǫ = 0, there exists an SCEq. In particular, (x∗, z∗) are given by (xˆ∗, zˆ∗) in the optimal solution to (SPP),
and the equilibrium prices are given by
P ∗2 (w) = µˆ
∗(w), P ∗1 = λˆ
∗. (35)
Proof 4: Our setting with ǫ = 0 can be seen as a special case of that in [3]. The proof then follows from Theorem 1 in [3].
Theorem 6: If 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, then there exists a competitive equilibrium. In particular, (x∗, z∗) are given by (xˆ∗, zˆ∗), the
optimal solution to problem (SPP), and the equilibrium prices are given by
P ∗2 (w) =


µˆ∗(w)
(1−ǫ+ ǫ
1−α )
0 ≤ w ≤ θˆ∗
µˆ∗(w)
(1−ǫ) θˆ
∗ ≤ w < yˆ∗
0 yˆ∗ ≤ w
, P ∗1 = λˆ
∗, (36)
where θˆ∗ = min{F−1W (1− α), yˆ
∗}.
Proof 5: By Lemma 4, the objective and all constraints in (SPP) are continuously differentiable. Problem (32)-(34) has
Lagrangian
L =
∑
i
aixˆ
2
i + (1− ǫ)
∫ yˆ
0
∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (w) fW (w) dw
+
ǫ
1− α
∫ θˆ
0
∑
i
a˜izˆ
2
i (w) fW (w) dw
+ λˆ
(
D −
∑
i
xˆi − yˆ
)
+
∫
µˆ(w)
(
yˆ − w −
∑
i
zˆi(w)
)
fW (w) dw.
Let
cˆǫ,α(w) =


1− ǫ + ǫ1−α 0 ≤ w ≤ θˆ
∗
1− ǫ θˆ∗ < w < yˆ∗
0 yˆ∗ ≤ w
. (37)
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Then, in addition to feasibility, the optimality conditions for (32)-(34) are [13]:
2aixˆ
∗
i − λˆ
∗ ≥ 0 ∀ i (38)
xˆ∗i
(
2aixˆ
∗
i − λˆ
∗
)
= 0 ∀ i (39)
−λˆ∗ +
∫
µˆ∗(w)fW (w) dw ≥ 0 (40)
yˆ∗
(
−λ∗ +
∫
µˆ∗(w)fW (w) dw
)
= 0 (41)
2a˜icˆ
∗
ǫ,α(w)zˆ
∗
i (w) − µˆ
∗(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (42)
zˆ∗i (w)
(
2a˜icˆ
∗
ǫ,α(w)zˆ
∗
i (w) − µˆ
∗(w)
)
= 0 ∀w (43)
µˆ∗(w)
(
yˆ∗ − w −
∑
i
zˆ∗i (w)
)
= 0 ∀w, (44)
µˆ∗(w) ≥ 0 ∀w. (45)
In addition to feasibility, the optimality conditions for (GENi) are
2a˜ix
G∗
i − P1 ≥ 0 (46)
xG∗i
(
2a˜ix
G∗
i − P1
)
= 0. (47)
2a˜iz
G∗
i (w)− P2(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (48)
zG∗i (w)
(
2a˜iz
G∗
i (w) − P2(w)
)
= 0 ∀w. (49)
In view of optimality conditions (42) and (43), we choose the following price schedule
P2(w) =


µˆ∗(w)
((1−ǫ)+ ǫ
1−α )
0 ≤ w ≤ θˆ∗
µˆ∗(w)
(1−ǫ) θˆ
∗ ≤ w < yˆ∗
0 yˆ∗ ≤ w
, P1 = λˆ
∗.
Given these choices, for each i, the optimality conditions for (GENi) become
2aix
G∗
i − λˆ
∗ ≥ 0 ∀ i (50)
xG∗i
(
2aix
G∗
i − λˆ
∗
)
= 0 ∀ i (51)
2a˜icˆǫ,α(w)z
G∗
i (w)− µˆ
∗(w) ≥ 0 ∀w (52)
zG∗i (w)
(
cˆǫ,α(w)z
G∗
i (w)− µˆ
∗(w)
)
= 0 ∀w. (53)
Choosing xG∗i = xˆ
∗
i for all i and z
G∗
i (w) = zˆ
∗
i (w) for all i and w, (50) and (51) become identical to (38) and (39), and (52)
and (53) become identical to (42) and (43).
Therefore xG∗i = xˆ
∗
i for all i, and z
G∗
i (w) = zˆ
∗
i (w) for all i and w, and the selected prices, together with (xˆ
∗
i , zˆ
∗
i (w)) for
all i and w constitute an SCEq, and we have shown by construction the existence of an SCEq.
Assuming zˆ∗i (w) > 0 for any i (and therefore for all i), the second stage price given in (36) can be rewritten in terms of the
social planner’s primal decision variables and the level of renewable generation. Rearranging the term in parenthesis in (43)
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gives
zˆ∗i (w) =
µˆ∗(w)
cˆǫ,α(w)
∀w ≤ yˆ∗. (54)
Summing both sides of (54) over i and using constraint (15) gives
yˆ∗ − w =
µˆ∗(w)
2a˜ · cˆǫ,α(w)
=⇒
µˆ∗(w)
cˆǫ,α(w)
= 2a˜(yˆ∗ − w). (55)
Thus when 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, we have
P ∗2 (W ) = 2a˜ · [yˆ
∗ −W ]+ .
Given that xˆ∗i > 0 for any i (and therefore for all i), a similar calculation gives
λˆ∗ = P ∗1 = 2a(D − yˆ
∗),
where a =
(∑
i
1
ai
)−1
.
We now address the case where ǫ = 1, as prices given in the statement of Theorem 6 cannot be applied directly in the case
where θˆ∗ < yˆ∗. Consider a sequence {ǫ(k)}, where limk→∞ ǫ(k) = 1. Then, suppressing the dependence of µˆ(w) on ǫ, and
taking the limit as k →∞ on both sides of (55) gives
lim
k→∞
µˆ∗(w)
cˆ∗
ǫ(k),α(w)
= 2a˜ ·
(
lim
k→∞
yˆ∗(ǫ(k))− w
)
. (56)
The limit limk→∞ yˆ
∗(ǫ(k)) exists, as (SPP) may be solved for the case where ǫ = 1, and the optimal solution is unique given
our assumptions on the generator cost function form.
Therefore, it still holds in the case where ǫ = 1 that P ∗2 (W ) = 2a˜ · [yˆ
∗−W ]+, and in turn a competitive equilibrium is given
by (xˆ∗, zˆ∗(·), P ∗1 , P
∗
2 (·)), where P
∗
1 = λˆ
∗ and P ∗2 (W ) = 2a˜ · [yˆ
∗ −W ]+. Finally we give the following lemma on continuity
of the equilibrium prices in ǫ.
Lemma 7: The equilibrium prices given in Theorem 6 are continuous in ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof 6: See Appendix.
V. TWO-STAGE MECHANISM FOR RISK AWARE ELECTRICITY MARKET WITH RENEWABLE GENERATION
In the proof of Theorem 6, it was shown that the SCEq prices arise as optimal dual solutions to (SPP). If we assume that the
generators are not strategic, and that all participants know the distribution of W , then the following mechanism implements
the SCEq:
(1) Each generator i submits cost function coefficients ai and a˜i.
(2) The ISO solves (SPP), and announces stage 1 price P ∗1 and stage 2 price schedule P
∗
2 (·) as given by (36).
(3) Generator i solves (GEN1i) and receives P
∗
1 x
G∗
i .
(4) At the start of stage 2, the renewable generation output W = w is observed by the generators. Generator i solves
(GEN2i) and pays P
∗
2 (w)z
G∗
i (w).
(5) Generator i produces xG∗i + z
G∗
i (w).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we consider a two-stage electricity market model with a single customer and multiple generators, taking into
account the risk preferences of the customer while assuming that the generators are risk neutral. Our goal has been to determine
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if a sequential competitive equilibrium exists in such a market, given this discrepancy in risk attitude. We show that such an
equilibrium does exist by formulating the risk aware stochastic economic dispatch market as a two-stage stochastic program,
and solving this problem to determine equilibrium energy procurements and prices. The equilibrium prices directly reflect
the social planner’s risk attitude. Given these prices, we specify a market mechanism for implementation of the equilibrium,
assuming that the generators are not strategic. In future work we will incorporate network topology, multiple consumers, and
strategic behavior in both the generators and consumers and general convex cost functions.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since CVaRα is a coherent risk function, by Proposition 6.5 of [13] it is continuous. Also, CVaRα is clearly a proper,
monotonic risk function.
For every possible realization W = w and first stage decision xˆ, there always exists a feasible solution to second stage
problem (9)-(15), so cSPP2 (xˆ,W ) is finite with probability 1 for all feasible xˆ. Together with the quadratic forms of the first
and second stage cost functions, this implies that cSPP2 (xˆ,W ) ∈ L1(Ω,F , P ) for all feasible xˆ.
Therefore by Proposition 6.37 of [13] we can write
CVaRα(c
SPP
2 (xˆ,W )) = inf
zˆ(·)∈G(x,·)
CVaRα
(∑
i
a˜i(zˆi(·))
)
, (57)
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where zˆ(·) : Ω → RN . zˆ(·) ∈ G(x, ·) denotes that zˆ(w) is a feasible choice for the constraint set in problem (9)-(15), given
first stage decision (xˆ, yˆ), for any w.
The argument for interchanging expectation and minimization over zˆ(·) follows from the interchangeability principle (The-
orem 7.80 in [13]). 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Let F (ǫ) denote the feasible set of (SPP), given parameter ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. From [14], the local compactness (LC) of F at some
ǫ is satisfied if there exists a δ > 0 and compact set C0 such that
⋃
‖ǫ−ǫ‖≤δ
F (ǫ) ⊂ C0.
Observing (SPP) is equivalent to a problem with the same objective and constraints, with the additional constraints that∑
i xˆi ≤ D, yˆ ≤ D and
∑
i zˆi(w) ≤M for a large enough finite M , and that the feasible set of (SPP) does not depend upon
ǫ, LC is satisfied for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
From [14] the constraint qualification (CQ) holds for F (ǫ) at some (xˆ, zˆ(·), ǫ) with (xˆ, zˆ(·)) ∈ F (ǫ) if there is a sequence
{xˆν , zˆν(·)}ν∈N → (xˆ, zˆ(·)) such that, given (xˆν , zˆν(·)), (15) is satisfied with strict inequality for all ν. Clearly this condition
holds for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
Define the optimal solution set of (SPP), given ǫ, as S(ǫ). Then, since LC and CQ are satisfied for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1] by Lemma 5.6
in [14], S(ǫ) is outer semicontinuous, meaning that for all sequences {xˆ∗ν , zˆ
∗(·)ν , ǫν}ν∈N, with ǫν → ǫ and (xˆ
∗
ν , zˆ
∗(·)ν) ∈ S(ǫν),
there exists an (xˆ
∗
, zˆ
∗
(·)) ∈ S(ǫ) such that ‖xˆ∗ν − xˆ
∗
‖ → 0 and ‖zˆ∗(·)ν − zˆ
∗
(·)‖ → 0 for ν →∞.
Due to the strict convexity of the first and second stage cost functions, the objective of (SPP) is strictly convex, so that
when an optimal solution (xˆ∗, zˆ∗(·)) exists, it is unique. Therefore, outer semicontinuity of the optimal primal solutions in ǫ
is equivalent to continuity in ǫ. Since the equilibrium prices depend continuously on the primal solutions to (SPP), the prices
themselves are continuous at any ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. 
